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The report aims to show the security of wireless communication between multimedia A/V 
accessories such as headsets and speakers and a VoIP mobile application using peer-to-
peer communication. The communication protocols emphasized are Bluetooth technologies 
and Near Field communication. The security of the communication line is a concern nowa-
days and professionals are still finding a means to make such intrusions more secure. 
 
In this project, first of all the necessary tools and software had to be installed for a compatible 
Windows environment to develop the mobile application, after which the communication be-
tween the accessory and application was tested. Next, in order to test the security of the 
communication, a Linux-based operating system was set up in which a brute attack was 
carried out on the wireless communication lines using a terminal console. 
 
This study can be implemented in future accessory application or hardware to work on any 
possible security holes to prevent a possible risk of integrity breach of information. This re-
port may help companies to analyse the threats posed and possibilities that can be partook 
for a secure application development.    
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1  Introduction     
 
The goal of this thesis is to address the vulnerability in Bluetooth and NFC security during 
communication between a phone and wireless hardware. An application is developed to 
aid this research and to address possible solutions to the security flaws. In order to fully 
comprehend how the Bluetooth and NFC susceptibility occurs, the report will guide the 
reader to an understanding of these wireless technologies and then carry on forward 
with the experimental work. 
 
Due to the rising popularity of wireless technology, security is considered a crucial factor 
that requires serious consideration when implementing communication means as they 
are susceptible to malicious attacks and vulnerability exploitations. Both Bluetooth and 
NFC have a history for being a favourite target among hackers to tap or manipulate 
wirelessly streaming data.  
 
The research is based on an application developed under the Windows Phone 8 frame-
work and wireless multimedia A/V accessories. The time invested in this project is esti-
mated 5 months with all crucial features being implemented. The accessory maintains 
wireless communication between itself and the phone while the application aids in mod-
ifying settings and exchanging data between them. The connection between the software 
and the hardware is maintained by Bluetooth which is initiated via NFC and these proto-
cols are topic of focus in this report. The intention is to reproduce the attacks and theorize 
solutions to impede possible interception of sensitive data. 
 
This thesis will highlight the aforementioned security vulnerabilities by analysing and 
testing a smartphone application project. Thus this research will benefit IT companies or 
individuals researching on software security testing and on minimising security threats 
to their mobile applications using Bluetooth and NFC capabilities on smartphones.  
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 2     Near Field Communication  
 
 
Near field communication (NFC) is a wireless communication technology standard that 
uses radio technology to establish a two-way connection between two electronic devices 
transmitting data via radio waves with no requirement for the devices to be in physical 
contact. This is commonly used in proximity cards for transport fare payments, mobile 
payment solutions, phone-to-phone transactions, health insurance card, event-ticketing 
and museum services. 
 
The NFC technology was founded in 2004 by Sony, Nokia, and Philips. These compa-
nies banded to form the NFC Forum creating the technical specification standards for 
those developing NFC compatible devices and NFC tags. This is to maintain insurance 
that all NFC devices are able to communicate with other NFC devices. As more compa-
nies, such as Google and PayPal, started adopting NFC applications, the demand for 
such services rose and more businesses began supporting its use. In the future, NFC is 
envisioned to be a household feature that will be providing applications for frequent and 
everyday use. Such as the contactless payment system is currently used as a full-scale 
service limited to certain countries but is proposed to be a standard application to be 
installed worldwide in the coming years.   
 
 
2.1     Architecture and Operation 
 
 
NFC is based on RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) operating on the principle of 
electromagnetism which is a phenomenon produced when electrically charged particles 
in motion emit magnetic radiation. Depending on the frequency of the charged particle’s 
oscillation it creates various electromagnetic radiation which may include x-rays, gamma 
waves, radio waves etc. The radiation induces current which is used for data transmis-
sion. [1.] On bringing an electronic reader in the proximity of a RFID tag (both are pow-
ered magnetically) leads to the induction of electricity within the tag which creates a new 
magnetic field. The reader detects it and registers the tag as seen on figure 1.  
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Figure 1. Demonstrates an example of data exchange using NFC [2] 
 
There are two kinds of RFID technology: passive RFID systems and active RFID sys-
tems. The passive RFID is applied when the NFC feature is fitted within a fob or a card 
and to activate it the user taps it on a reader occurring on high frequencies and ultra-
high frequency radio bands. The tag does not require a power source. Thus it emits a 
weak signal that is acknowledged by the strong signal from the reader. Hence the com-
munications range between the devices is very short and limited. This paradigm is prev-
alently used in Proximity Access Control in an internal security control area in tracking 
visitors and employees within corporate campuses since the early 2000s having re-
placed swiping magnetic strip cards on expensive readers’ authentication system.  
 
Early adopters were Electronic Article Surveillance (EAS) systems which used passive 
RFID sticker tags to keep track of the number of stolen goods that would cause a tran-
sponder to signal an unpaid good. This method has advanced to keeping track of goods 
on shelves in libraries or drugs in hospitals. Due to the tag’s small size and low costs, it 
is more affordable and convenient to employ NFC systems. This passive RFIDS archi-
tecture is divided into three classifications: Shelf Management Systems, Proximity Ac-
cess Control and Choke Point Systems that is used in registrars for automatic identifica-
tion systems. The operating frequency ranges of passive tags are 128 KHz, 13.6 MHz, 
915 MHz, or 2.45 GHz. [2.] 
 
Meanwhile active RFID system operates on rechargeable embedded battery and trans-
mit stronger signals with longer communication range. Compared to passive RFID, ac-
tive RFID are able to withstand environmental conditions for a longer period of time and 
are more expensive due to its onboard power source. The tags are comprised of inte-
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grated circuits and antenna where the reader reads off the tags when both are in prox-
imity and transfers the data to the servers via Ethernet, USB port, wireless methods or 
Serial Ports (e.g. RS-232) where the information is further processed for tasks such as 
locating tags, searching item information etc. [2.] 
 
 
Figure 2. Block diagram of active RFID (copied from [3]) 
  
An active RFID consists of a server, reader/writer and tags as seen in figure 2 above. 
When the tag is in the reader’s proximity range, the reader according to the protocol 
propriety standard communicates and reads data from the tag. The tag uses 2.4 GHz as 
the standard frequency range and the transmitted radio signal takes a very short dura-
tion. Thus this conveniently manages the tag’s battery life span for an estimated one 
year. The reader may also read from multiple tags simultaneously and then transfer the 
data to the server via Ethernet, USB or wireless communication methods. The server 
has applications installed that carry out further processes using the data such as for 
tracking the asset’s location, railway vehicle detection system, animal tagging, track 
movement of machines in assembly plants. [3.] 
 
 
2.2     Security Concerns 
 
 
NFC is considered very secure since its applications require extremely short distance 
at most 20 cm. Nevertheless with its advent, early adopters of NFC feared becoming 
victims to its plausible misuses. Sensitive actions such as transferring money from one 
device to another in a contactless payment at a retailers is prone to make consumers 
uneasy to approve such technology. It is possible to bypass initial NFC data protection 
in a tag or device by changing permissions from readOnly to ReadAndWrite by forcing 
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overwrite and manipulating the entire function of the tag or device. Such as tampering 
with the id number in a key knob used in industrial premises and get illegal access to 
buildings. This is applied to any open unprotected tags that are found in public places. 
It is best to avoid tapping suspicious tags found in public places especially tags used 
for advertisement purposes. 
Other ways NFC can be misused is to eavesdrop on information that is being trans-
ferred or during a transaction. Due to NFC being built on the basis of radio frequency, 
the NFC spectrum can be disrupted by broadcasting radio signals during an ongoing 
transaction to thwart this transaction. An NFC-enabled phone theft is another major 
concern where the thief can theoretically use the phone over a card reader to make 
purchases at stores or access sensitive information stored within the phone. To pre-
vent this, the user needs to diligently keep their phones tightly secured by setting pass-
words.    
 
However, as NFC advances the security holes are continued to be covered by the NFC 
Forum. Such as, by simultaneously masking communication between devices by trans-
mitting random series of bits making the communication channel secure, an eaves-
dropper is prevented from stealing sensitive data.  
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3     Bluetooth Low Energy 
 
 
Bluetooth is a standard using short range radio link. This is a low power consuming 
and high-speed wireless technology for exchanging data. One of its specification (IEEE 
802.15.1) is being prevalently used for linking peripherals such as cell phones, PDAs 
and home entertainment appliances. It was primarily developed to provide wireless net-
working and data transferring between consumer devices. It uses 2.5 GHz ISM band 
radio frequencies for data transfer. [23.] 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Bluetooth logo  
 
Bluetooth development commenced in 1994. A Swedish company Ericsson Mobile Com-
munications launched the Bluetooth wireless technology movement. Ericsson wanted to 
investigate a radio interface that would prove low-cost and low-power. Goals included 
the elimination of wire clutter between different devices from differing industries. A group 
of companies in 1998 worked together to connect their products using the Bluetooth 
technology [3.] 
 
In 1994, Ericsson Mobile Communication in Sweden started a wireless technology move-
ment where they wanted to research low power radio interface that would cost less to 
produce. Engineering procedures began in 1995 after radio technology demonstrated a 
possibility to build a universal bridge for data networks and also to build peripheral inter-
faces according to Emory University [3.] 
 
In 1996, a not-for-profit, non-stock corporation and private trade association on Bluetooth 
was founded and in 1998 with five founding companies established the Bluetooth Special 
Interest Group (SIG): Ericsson Mobile Communications, Nokia, IBM, Intel and Toshiba.  
Figure 3 signifies the logo created by SIG. The SIG has invited over 19000 Bluetooth 
adopters and member companies worldwide that have signed a zero cost agreement. A 
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royalty-free license allows products based on the Bluetooth technology to enable coop-
eration between different sectors.  
 
SIG aims to promote novel applications in the healthcare, fitness, and security and home 
entertainment industries. As the non-stock organization is responsible for the spontane-
ous evolution of Bluetooth in engineering, designing and marketing, the corporation has 
announced new updated specifications and adopted profiles and protocols over the 
years. [3.] 
 
 
Specifications & 
Adopted date 
Notes 
Core Version 4.0 
30 June 2010 
Low Energy  Lower power consumption using a cell bat-
tery alone  
  applications from markets including 
healthcare, fitness, home entertainment and 
security  
 
Core Version 3.0  
+ HS 
21 April 2009 
High speed  enables applications t use 802.11 MAC/PHY 
through addition of Generic Alternative 
MAC/PHY  
 
Core Version 2.1 + 
EDR (Enhanced 
Data Rate) 
26 July 2007 
Secure simple 
pairing 
 Allows secure device pairing with a but-
ton press, numeric entry, numeric com-
pare and Out Of Band 
  
 
Core Version 2.0 + 
EDR 
4 Nov 2004 
 Enhanced Data Rate (EDR) is introduced for fast data transfer 
Core Versions 1.0  Necessary Bluetooth hardware and transmission procedures 
that did not employ anonymity to devices. 
 
Table 1. Demonstrates the headline features in Bluetooth specifications over the years (Revised 
from presentation by Robin Heydon [3]) 
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Most notably in the 2010, SIG introduced Smart Technology or Bluetooth Low Energy 
(BLE) which in contrast to classic Bluetooth protocol provides lower power consumption 
at lower cost while maintaining the communication range. BLE was initially announced 
by Nokia in 2006 as “Wibree” which has been added to the Bluetooth Core Specification 
Version 4.0 in 2010.  
 
Bluetooth was primarily used as a substitute to expensive wires and WPAN (wireless 
personal area network) for connecting portable or fixed electronic devices such as mon-
itors, keyboards and mice. However, it progressed to connect between phones to any 
supported device like car stereo to listen to music, printer to print pictures from camera, 
record heart rate performance while jogging using low-energy wearables and 
smartphone, baby monitors, garage doors, hands-free system to converse on phone 
while driving and medical peripherals to check body conditions.  
  
 
 
3.1     Architecture and Operations 
 
 
Bluetooth operations commence with a master and a slave radio based devices where 
each has a fixed 48 bit unique device address known as BD_ADDR or MAC address. 
Several of these radio devices form a piconet which is an ad-hoc network where these 
devices share a same channel. A piconet consists of one master device and several 
slave devices as seen on figure 4. An active device is recognizable using its first 3 bit 
BD_ADDR while the inactive slaves stay in the piconets network. Multiple piconets con-
nected with one another form a scatternet. However, a master can participate in only 
one piconet while a slave can be in multiple piconets on a time division multiplex basis. 
[4.] 
 
The Bluetooth communication link is initiated with the master device to the slave device. 
A slave device may request the master device to switch to the master. Other slaves 
within the piconet have no connection with each other. Thus communication exists only 
between the master and the slave. Bluetooth uses frequency-hopping spread spectrum 
which a form of radio signal transmission on one frequency for a certain interval then 
randomly hops or changes its carrier to another from among multiple frequency channels 
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in fast intervals in a random sequence which known only to the receiver and transmitter. 
[13.] 
 
 
Figure 4 displays Bluetooth master/slave piconets topologies [14] 
 
 
There are two types of Bluetooth technology systems: Low Energy (LE) and Basic Rate 
(BR). Previously known as Bluetooth Smart, the term Low Energy was assigned for tech-
nical purposes. LE is a successor to BR which was the traditional system consisting of 
Enhanced Data rate (EDR), Alternate Media Access Control (MAC) and Physical layer 
extensions (PHY).  
 
BLE has contributed to myriad benefits and improvement over BR, factors which are 
lowering power consumption by more than half and slightly increased communication 
range over 100 meters where BR was limited within 10 to 100 meters. Benefits also 
include connecting unlimited numbers of slaves and decreased latency period between 
connected and disconnected state. However, radio frequency is maintained at 2.4 GHz 
ISM, data throughput is still improved by adaptive frequency hopping (this allows devices 
to actively hop around other frequencies to avoid interference) excluding forward error 
correction for LE, voice capability is viable only for BR and service discovery eligible by 
both.  
 
 
3.4     Security Overview 
 
 
Bluetooth is highly secure as it uses the Secure and Fast Encryption Routine 
(SAFER+) engine which uses 128 bit keys to authenticate devices. In this instance the 
connecting devices share a secret key which is derived from a Personal Identification 
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Number (PIN) which is a Bluetooth passkey. The PIN is input via the user interface of 
an application and authenticated by the master device. Once authenticated the con-
nection is established and the devices are permitted to create and share link keys with 
each other to encrypt their data traffic. This creating, sharing and authenticating is 
known as pairing. [15.] However, it is possible to bypass PIN security by exploiting the 
request and grant permission process. 
Bluetooth security is always under intense scrutiny due to its past history of vulnerabili-
ties having been used as a tool to compromise privacy. One popular decade old threat 
was in specification version 1 when it was possible to send a person an infected file 
without his/her acknowledgement.  Bluetooth being a peer-to-peer network lacks a cen-
tralized security infrastructure. Thus for its numerous and diverse profile support for 
various devices such as headsets, printing, dialup networking etc. leads it to become 
very prone to vulnerabilities. 
A major vulnerability is solved by implementing encryption algorithms that both users 
share and accept on acknowledging connection and pairing. The strength of this security 
relies on the randomness of the passkey and this connection is saved for later authenti-
cation. Bluetooth discoverability is made an optional feature, meaning a user can turn it 
off or on. In addition, the Data via Basic rate system is secured by 56 bit E0 (classic)/128 
AES (AMP) while data from LE is protected by 128 bit AES and this is also being imple-
mented on BR nowadays. Applications layer for both methods are user defined.   
 
Security threats commonly involve identity theft, unintended access of data over the 
voice channel, denial of service and location detection mostly due to the fact that profiles 
tend to have common fixed passkeys which is "0000" [16]. The more severe attacks are 
the following: 
 Bluejacking is sending anonymous and unrequested messages, images or 
sounds over Bluetooth to other compatible devices with a 10 meters range [17]. 
The consequence may be severe if malicious software or spams are sent leading 
the receiver to believe his/her phone is malfunctioning.  
 
 Bluesnarfing is the remote theft of data via Bluetooth from a device in discovera-
ble mode without leaving evidence of the attack. The data can be a user’s con-
tacts, messages, calendar and email which can be tampered with, deleted and 
copied from. [18] 
11 
 
 
A software called CarWhisperer [5] is used to bluesnarf attack other BLE enabled 
audio speaker devices by sending and receiving audio to and from it. Here a 
simple phone call can be intercepted without the victim’s knowledge. [19]  
 
 Bluebugging is to remotely access the victim’s phones and use the phones ap-
plications initiating man-in-the-middle attack such as placing phone calls and 
sending text messages which can lead to high phone bills to the victim also with-
out his or her awareness. [19] 
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4     Windows Phone Operating System 
 
 
Windows Phone is a relatively new propriety mobile operating system by Microsoft Cor-
poration. It is the successor to a previous version of a mobile operating system known 
as Windows Mobile. However, being a new version it does not support backward com-
patibility to its predecessor’s applications. Windows Phone featured Kernel which is 
based on Windows CE (Compact Edition). The second generation of this system called 
Windows Phone 8 was released in October 2012 which replaces the CE-based architec-
ture with Windows NT Kernel. [20.]  
 
 
Figure 5. Customized Start Screens with Live Tiles on Windows Phone 8(copied from [20]) 
   
The series is noted for featuring a unique, fresh user interface codenamed “Modern UI” 
intending to “Put People First” as their product motto. Figure 5 shows Windows Phone’s 
start screen user interface introducing live tiles in mobile operating systems. The inter-
face is a typography based design language inspired by the transport system focusing 
more on content than chrome. It consists of a Start Screen with size varying “Live Tiles” 
which are linked to the application and display updates and notifications from the app.  
In addition “Hub” links all of the user’s social sites accounts into one app from which the 
user can seamlessly interact with the sites directly (e.g. Commenting on photos directly). 
Other features include lock screen notifications, launchers and choosers, “Kid’s Corner” 
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which makes the phone more child friendly and user customizable interface for person-
alization, Wallet app, Nokia Maps app, in App purchasing and multitasking [21].   
 
 
4.1     History of Features 
 
 
Windows Phone 8 and further updated versions include new features and improvement 
of existing components. Having moved to a kernel architecture and changing any major 
underlying subsystem, Windows Phone 8 shares the same file system, network stack, 
security components, graphics engine (DirectX), hardware abstraction layer (HAL) and 
device driver framework as Windows 8. [7] This makes it possible to port applications 
between Windows Phone 8/8.1 and Windows 8/8.1 effortlessly due to the multicore pro-
cessor support.  
 
CoreCLR is introduced in Windows Phone 8 which consists of an auto tuning garbage 
collector which results in quicker boot and responsiveness in apps. The async program-
ming model is featured across .NET Framework libraries resulting in increased  
responsive UI experience.  
  
 
 
 
4.2     Windows Phone App Development 
 
 
Applications for Windows Phone are developed using Visual Studio 2013 (and higher 
versions) [6] and Expression Blend which focuses mainly on the user interface aspects. 
C# is the primary programming language used to build the backend while frontend is 
also possible while XAML (Extensible Application Mark-up Language) which is an XML 
language used as the user interface language. XAML is a language based on XML while 
C# is an object oriented language inheriting features from C, C++, Visual Basic and Java.  
 
However both C# and XAML also support application development on WPF (Windows 
Presentation Foundation), Silverlight and Windows Store. Windows Phone 8 has intro-
duced native code support for C and C++ which introduce the ability to use Direct3D and 
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other gaming middleware [21]. Recent updates such as Windows Phone 8.1 SDK sup-
port application development with HTML5/JavaScript, C++ and Visual Basic.NET. 
 
    
 
4.3     Bluetooth and NFC Capabilities 
 
 
Bluetooth 2.1 is supported by Windows Phone 7 which is an improvised version that pair 
the phone and devices such as headsets, speakers and a car audio system [26], while 
Windows Phone 8 has much improved and updated version of the Bluetooth profiles.  
 
Bluetooth user profiles supported by Windows Phone are the following: 
 Advanced Audio Distribution Profile (A2DP1.2) is the same for both WP7 and 
WP8 
 Audio/Video Remote Control Profile (AVRCP 1.4) has updated from AVRCP 1.3 
 Hand Free Profile (HFP 1.5) for both WP7 and WP8 
 Phone Book Access Profile (PBAP 1.1) is the same for both WP7 and WP8 
 Object Push Profile (OPP 1.1) is a new profile added to WP8 
 Out of Band (OOB) is also a new profile added to WP8 
 Near Field Communication (NFC) is a new profile as well supported only by WP8 
and later versions  
 In addition to supporting all that WP8 supports, WP8.1 also supports:  
o Hands Free Profile (HFP 1.6)  
o Network Access Point (NAP) which allows the phone to share cellular 
data connection with another device via Bluetooth. 
o Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) [27] 
 
In order to develop applications using Bluetooth connectivity, the developer uses the 
Bluetooth API provided by the Windows Phone SDK. To be able to utilise Bluetooth fea-
tures ID_CAP_PROXIMITY and ID_CAP_NETWORKING capabilities should be ena-
bled in WMAppManifest.xml file during application development in Visual Studio. The 
API provides access to peer discovery such as peer finder, peer information, stream 
socket and connection request (these Windows Runtime classes are also used for NFC 
based development). [28.] 
 
15 
 
 
As mentioned above, the near field communication feature is only implemented in WP8 
and the later versions of the OS.  Figure 6 shows the most common uses of NFC on 
windows phone. NFC allows two devices to connect to each other by tapping each 
other’s NFC and exchange digital objects such as electronic business card, media con-
tents etc. Also by tapping an unpowered NFC tag on a smart poster advertisement (con-
tains digital content) with the phone, the user is able to acquire the stored content. 
 
 
Figure 6 Different scenarios where NFC is used [29] 
 
 
For application’s NFC development capabilities ID_CAP_NETWORKING and 
ID_CAP_PROXIMITY must be turned on in WMAppManifest.xml file as well. For using 
the NFC feature, the proximity API is also provided by the Windows Phone SDK. It gives 
access to the following Windows Runtime classes. 
 PeerFinder – Discovers the same application on the tapped device and creates 
a socket connection between the applications on different phones. 
 ProximityDevice – Allows the application to communicate and exchange data 
with the other device on distance of 3-4 centimetres. 
 PeerInformation – Is able to view peer’s information 
 ProximityMessage – Receives a message after subscribing to a device 
 ConnectionRequestedArgs – Is a request event for connection. 
 TriggeredConnectionStateChangedEventArgs - Alerts the application when the 
device is unconnected or unsubscribed. [30.] 
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5     Bypass of Accessory’s Security 
 
 
 
In any wireless networking setup, security is a concern. Especially when radio frequen-
cies are involved, there is always a potential security risk. It is possible for an unscrupu-
lous person to eavesdrop on communications and transactions between NFC devices 
with the right antenna, hardware and software. Devices can easily grab radio waves out 
of air, so people who send sensitive information over a wireless connection need to take 
precautions to make sure those signals are not intercepted. 
  
Since our targeting accessory is a speaker or headset, the Bluetooth penetration attack 
that is carried out includes blue-bugging. This is possible by using software called  
CarWhisperer which mainly allows third party intruders to send audio to and receive au-
dio from a Bluetooth-enabled car stereo. But it can be used to target speakers and head-
sets as well.  
 
 
 
 
5.2     NFC Attack 
 
 
To get access to a Bluetooth accessory one needs to acquire the accessory’s MAC ad-
dress. MAC address (Media Access Control) is a unique identifier of network devices 
and is also referred as physical address. It is written in 6 bytes where the first 3 are the 
manufacturer’s standard ID number and the last 2 are serial number allotted by the man-
ufacturer. 
 
We can use the NFC feature of the targeted accessory to obtain the MAC address ef-
fortlessly by using smartphones applications. In this instance we are using “NFC Com-
mander” [38] a Windows Phone application that reads NFC tags or stickers NDEF mes-
sages. NDEF (NFC Data Exchange Format) is a standard binary data set that is encoded 
in NFCs and used to exchange as payloads with information between NFC compatible 
devices [39]. 
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After opening NFC Commander Application, we tap the phone to the accessory’s NFC 
and read its data. The raw data view in hex shows the result in figure 7 below. 
 
 
Figure 7 The raw data from the accessories NFC 
 
The MAC address is identified starting from the 82nd character and reading backwards 
which results in 0B:75:11:67:11:00. The Bluetooth hack covered in detail in the section 
5.2, become easier with the gathered MAC address. However, this shows that being in 
physical contact with the accessory gives potential illicit access to you conversation that 
goes through that accessory. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2     Bluetooth Attack 
 
   
In order to breach into the Bluetooth’s protocol line, Ubuntu 14.04.3 and Ubuntu Linux 
based operating system called Kali OS was used which concentrates on digital forensics 
are utilized. For testing offensive security exploits, KDE’s UNIX terminal emulator called 
Konsole, which is a supporting embedded terminal functionality, is used. The first step 
was to install development files for using the Linux Bluetooth library by running the fol-
lowing command on the terminal and the results are seen on figure 8. 
 
sudo apt-get install libbluetooth-dev 
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Figure 8. The result after installing libbluetooth lib 
 
The CarWhisperer [5] is downloaded, then untarred, compiled and installed by using the 
following commands. The results are seen on figure 9. 
 
wget http://trifinite.org/Downloads/carwhisperer-
0.2.tar.gz  
tar zxvf carwhisperer-0.2.tar.gz 
cd carwhisperer-0.2 
make 
sudo make install 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. The results for installing CarWhisperer 
  
The CarWhisperer’s source code is compiled that required external Ubuntu libraries as 
shown in figure 10.  
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Figure 10 Building Car-Whisperer source code 
 
Audio devices tend to request for a pin, the pincode usually set as ‘0000’. So to auto-
matically return the same pincode to all Bluetooth pin requests a simple passkey agent 
is used. Simple agent is installed using the following command. The results are shown 
in figure 11. 
wget https://gist.github.com/x2q/5285011/raw/simple-agent 
# Kill the existing passkey agent 
pkill -9 bluetooth-applet 
chmod +x simple-agent 
./simple-agent 
 
 
Figure 11 The results for installing simple key agent 
20 
 
 
 
First detect Bluetooth adapters or dongles installed in the computer by using hciconfig –
a command like the following. As seen in figure 12, there are two, hci1 and hci0. Hci0 is 
the Bluetooth adapter and hci1 is the Bluetooth dongle.hci1 will be used to find Bluetooth 
devices. 
 
 
Figure 12 The results for hciconfig -a 
 
This command sudo hciconfig hci1 up is used to get the Bluetooth dongle up and run-
ning. For the hci1 to connect to an audio device, this command #hciconfig hci0 class 
0x200404 is used. The result can be seen in figure 12 under hci1’s service classes stat-
ing Audio/Video device confirming to the Speaker/Headset profile. To detect Bluetooth 
devices using the terminal, the following command is used.  
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Figure 13. Demonstrates the results for Bluetooth devices around. 
 
As seen in figure 13, two devices are detected and here we can see MA-825 is the device 
we will be targeting for the penetration test since it has the same mac address we have 
identified in the aforementioned NFC attack in section 5.1. If MA-825 had been con-
nected to a smartphone it would not have shown up in figure 12 and our obtained MAC 
address from the NFC attack would still be usable in our next step. 
 
In order to connect to device “MA-825”, we need to find its open RfComm channel. 
RfComm (Radio frequency communication) is a Bluetooth protocol that enables connec-
tion to multiple devices. 
 
 
Figure 14. The script written to detect RFComm channels 
 
In order to detect the free channel, a python script in figure 14 was written and it, as seen 
in figure 16 below, is executed using the MA-825’s mac address as the parameter. The 
script is named “scanRfcommChannels.py” and is necessary to detect all open MA-825 
RfComm channels.   
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Figure 15 All available RfComm channels for MA-825 
 
As seen in figure 15, the script “scanRfcommChannels.py” was successfully executed 
and was necessary in finding the right radio frequency channel. There were about 30 
open channels available for our next step.   
 
After obtaining an open RfComm channel, the next task is to tap into it. Car-Whisperer 
program is executed via the following command and parameters. 
carwhisperer <hci#> <messagefile> <recordfile> <bdaddr> 
[channel] 
 
<hci#> refers to the Bluetooth adapter. <messagefile> is a raw audio file that is played 
to the speaker, <recordfile> is the recorded message or conversation that is received as 
a raw audio file, <bdaddress> is the speakers MAC address and [channel] is the availa-
ble RFComm channel. For this instance we will be inserting a prerecorded message via 
the message file. If this command is successfully executed, we will be able to hear a 
message “hello” followed by a series of dots which means that the conversation is being 
recorded.  
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Figure 16 The results of executing the Car-Whisperer on the speaker 
 
After executing the hack command, the results in figure 16 show that we have success-
fully intercepted the speaker since we can hear a “hello” from the speaker and the saved 
out.raw file plays partial messages. 
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6     Video and Voice Call Application 
 
 
 
In this chapter, we develop a distributed VoIP based Windows Phone functional proof of 
the concept application. VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) is a system that converts 
analog audio signals into digital packets in real time and thus with this technology phone 
calls can be made over the internet.  We would take advantage from this application to 
counteract the Bluetooth headset hack. Thus the application is developed with security 
measures taken against the hack. 
  
The Development environment composed of Visual Studio 2013 for software develop-
ment using C# and C++ for Windows Phone. The operating system used was Windows 
8/10 as it alone provided comprehensive support to Visual Studio 2013 for Window 
Phone. In general, Perforce was used as the revision control system, as well as  
TortoiseSVN, Review Board as a code review tool and SharePoint as content and doc-
ument manager.  
  
  
 
 
6.1     Application Description and Architecture 
 
 
The application’s primary task is to make calls to other phones with the same application 
installed. Since the connection between the mobiles phones is made via NFC tapping, 
the phone needs to have NFC compatibility. The audio and video streaming is done via 
p2p service. The targeted speaker will be connected to one of the smartphones via Blue-
tooth. The caller’s A/V data packets will be encrypted before being transmitted to the 
receiver and the receiver’s application will decrypt the encrypted data packets to a legible 
A/V stream.  
 
The encryption will make it difficult for a third party to illegally intercept and decipher the 
encrypted message.  In addition, video streaming feature is added without noise cancel-
lation and the application lacks A/V compression feature that is required for smooth real 
time streaming. 
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Figure 17 The processes in the VoIP application 
 
 
The application consists of a frontend process and backend process. The frontend pro-
cess visualizes the application user interface and the backend process generates and 
receives the calls. Each process consists of one or several background processing com-
ponents that process incoming calls, foreground lifetime agents, call in progress and 
keep call alive task.  
 
 
Figure 18. WebRTC communication model 
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For the media streaming, IceLink SDK (developed by FrozenMountain) and its documen-
tation are used. This includes WebRTC extension for .Net which helps creates WebRTC 
compatible p2p A/V data streams [33]. WebRTC (Web Real-Time Communication) is a 
set of standards that enables A/V streaming and application data sharing without the 
need of third-party software. The WebRTC model in figure 18 shows signaling done via 
http between the web server and the clients. The two clients are running the application 
from the same web server and the P2P connection stream enables the clients to connect 
to each other.  
   
 
  
6.2     Design and Development 
 
 
There are two pages within the application. The user interface of the application’s Main-
Page.xaml consists of two buttons and a checkbox as seen in figure 19.  
  
 
 
Figure 19 The application’s front end 
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As seen in figure19, the “encrypted” checkbox allows the user to encrypt his call session. 
The “tap NFC and send info” button sends the smartphones push Channel Uri and secret 
encryption key to another smartphone with which it NFC tapped with. Both the 
smartphones should have the application opened during this process. While the “call” 
button is enabled once the connection session between the two smartphones are estab-
lished and the user is able to make a call to the other smartphone.  
 
The user interface of the second call page displays 2 video media elements (one for the 
caller and one for the receiver), “end call” button and name of the caller as the title. 
Figure 21 below displays the call page. 
 
In order to stream the audio and video, the receiver phone needs to possess the caller 
phone’s stream description. As per IceLink SDK aiding in creating the P2P link, the de-
scription includes data format, offer/answer and local address called candidates. The act 
of transferring stream descriptions to peer is known as signaling [32].  
 
Due to the stream description being heavy, push notification service is compatible tech-
nique for transferring the data. Push Notification service enables an application to send 
timely remote messages from a centralized system. To use this, the caller phone needs 
to know the receiver phone’s push channel Uri that is unique and acquired by a windows 
phone application after it has negotiated with Microsoft Push Notification Service 
(MPNS). Thus NFC tapping is done to interchange the peer phones’ push channel Uri. 
 
Having established the receiver phones push channel Uri, the caller may call the receiver 
phone. Once the receiver accepts the call, the caller phone becomes the “controlling 
agent” and the receiver phone becomes the “controlled agent”. The caller phone pro-
ceeds to convert the A/V stream description to raw data and send to the receiver via 
push notification service. In addition to sending A/V stream description, a security key 
for decryption purposes is also sent along. The receiver phone reconverts the raw data 
to stream description and create the P2P link after acknowledging the controlling agent’s 
offer [32].  
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Figure 20 Ongoing call page 
 
Both the caller and receiver phone navigate to the Call page as seen in figure 20. The 
video and audio stream is rendered and is visible to both the peers and they can enjoy 
a conversation. The video visible to the receiver including the audio appears to have high 
a latency that can be corrected with compression/decompression algorithm such as 
G711 vocoder [34]. However, the quality of the image is high. The “bluetooth” button 
connects the user to a Bluetooth headset or speaker. Pressing the “end call” button stops 
the call session.  
 
 
 
6.3     Implementation of Application’s Security Measures 
 
 
The worst case hacking scenario would be that a third party intruder would intercept the 
call via the Bluetooth speaker/headset, record the audio conversation in raw format, then 
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convert it to an audio file. To prevent this, we would encrypt the A/V stream that is trans-
mitted between the two caller and the receiver. So that the third party would hear an 
unintelligible audio file. 
 
In order to prevent the intruder to successfully decrypt the audio file, a unique secret key 
is exchanged only between the two callers. This secret key is vital to decrypt A/V mes-
sages. Without it the intruder will not be able to obtain any intelligible information. 
 
We will be using an encryption algorithm that is highly secure. AES (Advanced Encryp-
tion Standard), also known as Rjindael, is a symmetric block cipher encryption algorithm 
where a three block cipher encrypts/decrypts data in 128 bits block using symmetric 
secret key ciphers. These key ciphers is used for both encryption/decryption processes 
so they key should be known by both the sender and receiver [35]. Compared to algo-
rithms such as DES and tripleDES, AES’ performance is faster and better suited for very 
low memory requirements and is unaffected when it defends against external attacks. 
[36] 
  
The unique passkey is generated when the “encryption” checkbox on VoipApp’s main 
page is marked. Windows phone software development kit provides cryptography ser-
vices thus external inclusion of libraries is not needed. By using the “system.secu-
rity.cryptography” directive, we are able to access the encryption algorithms without im-
plementing it from scratch.    
   
 
First to create a unique secret key, a random number is generated then converted to 
bytes data then to string as seen in listing 1. Lastly after its generation, this unique key 
will be sent to the receiver phone via NFC tap along with push channel Uri information.  
 
Encryption of A/V stream is carried out if the “encryption” checkbox is marked on the 
Voip application’s main page. We need to split the A/V stream into chunks before en-
crypting them due its heavy size. The chunks are converted to bytes, encrypted using 
AESEncryption from listing 2 and then saved in a 2 dimensional array after being en-
crypted so that they can be decoded in sequence at the receiver end.  
 
As seen on listing 2, we have implemented secure salt password hash where salt is 
randomly generated bytes that is used to generate different cipher bytes for a same block 
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of encrypted data. This is done to avoid a dictionary attack where an intruder maybe able 
to decode encrypted messages due to its frequency. In general a dictionary attack is 
done by guessing a passkey by referring to myriad of possibilities like words in a diction-
ary. 
 
Next we create a Rijndael encryption object and set its encryption key size (values 
maybe 128, 192 and 256) and block sizes, setting initialization vector required to encrypt 
first data block and set its mode to Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) to encrypt a block as a 
single unit. Finally use this encryption object to encrypt the stream data bytes chunk. 
After the entire A/V stream is encrypted and stored in the 2d Array, it is sent to the re-
ceiver via UDP via IceLinks service. 
  
On receiving the encrypted stream, the receiver decrypts it to obtain an understandable 
A/V stream to render them to the User interface. As seen above in listing 3, the decryp-
tion method resemble same logic as the encryption method, besides calling a decryptor. 
However for decryption to work, all parameters except the encrypted data should be as 
same as the encryption methods parameters. 
 
 
 
 
7     Application Test against Attack Scenario 
  
 
Finally in this test scenario, the requirements are that the session between the caller and 
the receiver should be active with encryption check box checked for caller and either the 
caller or the receiver’s phone should be connected to the target Bluetooth speaker. The 
speaker will be used to tap into the conversation between the caller and the receiver 
which is this test’s main aim.  
 
The Bluetooth attack as seen in Chapter 5 Section 5.2 is repeated exactly the same way. 
Thus in this chapter we will display the final process which was carried out in Chapter 
5.2. After gathering free RFComm channels, CarWhisperer program is called via the 
following command: 
 
carwhisperer <hci#> <messagefile> <recordfile> <bdaddr>[channel] 
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From this the final result obtained will now be examined whether the outcome is a posi-
tive hack or negative hack.    
 
 
 
Figure 21 The results of executing CarWhisperer on encrypted A/V stream 
 
As seen in figure 25, the eavesdropping attempt via Bluetooth has been futile concluding 
that the encrypting of the A/V stream has succeeded in thwarting out unwarranted ac-
cess to the conversation between two smartphones.  
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8     Conclusion 
 
 
Security is an increasing concern especially with the radio signal based modes of com-
munication on the rise. I have summarized an understanding of Bluetooth and the NFC 
technology which are the two most used wireless standards on smartphones and exter-
nal media devices. In additional, I also examined their misuses with these accessories, 
such as gaining unsolicited access to sensitive information. 
 
In order to obtain proof of such threats, I successfully performed penetration tests on 
viable speaker. I went through the development of a VoIP based smartphone application 
to test unwanted access to the caller’s conversation via that application. Finally, I formu-
lated a way to dynamically implement secure methods as defensive mechanism.  
 
Hence, application developers are advised use peer-2-peer services to study new secu-
rity standards and be weary of impeding flaws in mobile communication lines. Besides 
encrypting outgoing data, developers should implement any latest security updates to 
applications at first opportunity. End users can be protected by changing default pin 
codes on their accessories, purchasing high-end speakers with limited access to availa-
ble radio channels and use reliable updated VoIP or peer-2-peer based applications. 
 
Conclusively, with a vast number of applications utilizing personal information, it is easier 
to take data security for granted but nevertheless it is best to be attentive of possible 
privacy breaches in the future as wireless communication systems show revolutionary 
prospects. 
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Appendices 
 
 
 
Random secure passkey generator 
 
 
System.Security.Cryptography.RandomNumberGenerator randomNum = new Sys-
tem.Security.Cryptography.RNGCryptoServiceProvider(): 
byte[] byetData = new byte[32]; 
randomNum.GetBytes(byteData);  
string passKey = Convert.ToBase64String(byteData);  
 
Listing 1 Code for creating random secure passkey in string format 
 
 
AES encryption code 
 
public byte[] AESEncryption(byte[] AVbytes, byte[] passKey) 
         { 
             
   byte[] salt = new byte[] { rand-
Number(),randNumber(), 
   randNumber(),randNumber(),rand-
Number(),randNumber(), 
   randNumber(),randNumber() }; 
   byte[] encryptedBytes = null; 
 
            using (MemoryStream ms = new MemoryStream()) 
            { 
                    RijndaelManaged algoKey = new RijndaelManaged(); 
                    algoKey.KeySize = 256; 
                    algoKey.BlockSize = 128; 
 
                    var key = new Rfc2898DeriveBytes(passkey, salt); 
                    algoKey.Key = key.GetBytes(algoKey.KeySize / 8); 
                    algoKey.IV = key.GetBytes(algoKey.BlockSize / 8); 
 
                    algoKey.Mode = CipherMode.CBC; 
 
                    using (var cs = new CryptoStream(ms, al-goKey.Cre-
ateEncryptor(),  CryptoStreamMode.Write)) 
                    { 
                        cs.Write(AVbytes, 0, AVBytes.Length); 
                        cs.Close(); 
                    } 
                    encryptedBytes = ms.ToArray(); 
              } 
             
 
            return encryptedBytes; 
        } 
 
Listing 2 AES encryption code (modified from [37]) 
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AES decryption code 
 
        public byte[] AES_Decrypt(byte[] encryptedBytes, byte[] passKey) 
        { 
             
            byte[] salt = new byte[] { randNumber(),randNumber(), 
   randNumber(),randNumber(),rand-
Number(),randNumber(), 
   randNumber(),randNumber() }; 
   byte[] decryptedBytes = null; 
 
            using (MemoryStream ms = new MemoryStream()) 
            { 
                    RijndaelManaged algoKey = new RijndaelManaged(); 
                    algoKey.KeySize = 256; 
                    algoKey.BlockSize = 128; 
 
                    var key = new Rfc2898DeriveBytes(passKey, salt); 
                    algoKey.Key = key.GetBytes(AES.KeySize / 8); 
                    algoKey.IV = key.GetBytes(AES.BlockSize / 8); 
 
                    algoKey.Mode = CipherMode.CBC; 
 
using (var cs = new CryptoStream(ms,al-goKey.CreateDecryptor(), Cryp-
toStreamMode.Write)) 
                    { 
                        cs.Write(encryptedBytes, 0, encrypt-
edBytes.Length); 
                        cs.Close(); 
                    } 
                    decryptedBytes = ms.ToArray(); 
                } 
            } 
 
            return decryptedBytes; 
        } 
  
   
  
 
Listing 3 Code to decrypt AES encrypted data (modified from [37]) 
 
 
